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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Amici2 are law professors who have devoted
their careers to the study and teaching of
bankruptcy law. They represent no institution,
group, or association.
Their interest in this appeal arises from the
impact that the Court’s decision in this case could
have on negotiated settlements in future bankruptcy cases, by upsetting years of practice in
which the courts have allowed exceptions to the
so-called absolute priority rule (hereinafter, the
“priority rule” or the “Rule”). Settlements are
often the most practical and economical way of
resolving contentious cases, saving valuable
judicial time, and speeding up distributions to the
creditors. Because the priority rule may stand in
the way of achieving a settlement in some
instances, the Amici hope to assist the Court in
reaching a result that will keep the Rule from
1

Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court, the
Amici file this brief with the written consent of all parties,
which is on file with this Court. No person or entity including
the Amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution for
the preparation or submission of this brief.
2

The Amici are the following law professors who teach
at the law schools indicated next to their names: Jagdeep S.
Bhandari, Wake Forest University School of Law; Susan
Block-Lieb, Fordham Law School; Jessica Gabel Cino, Georgia
State University College of Law; Linda E. Coco, Barry
University School of Law; Robert D’Agostino, John Marshall
Law School; Irina J. Fox, Creighton University School of
Law; C. Scott Pryor, Campbell University School of Law;
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Stetson University College of Law;
Nancy B. Rapoport, University of Nevada’s William S. Boyd
School of Law; Michael Sousa, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law; and Laura M. Spitz, Cornell Law School.
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2
unnecessarily preventing settlement in instances
where, as in the instant case, the settlement
would benefit the estate and the objecting parties
would suffer no loss from permitting the settlement. The Amici also believe that because the
settlement in this case would not prejudice
Petitioners, the decision of the Court of Appeals
below could be affirmed on that basis alone.
The Amici thus file this brief supporting
Respondents to urge the Court to decide this
appeal with these considerations in mind, and to
reject Petitioners’ incorrect and inflexible position
that the Rule is a per se rule that leaves
absolutely no room for any departure in any case
or under any circumstances.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In the case at bar, the Bankruptcy Court
approved a so-called “structured dismissal” under
which it both approved a settlement and
dismissed a chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the time of
the settlement, the estate possessed only two
assets: (1) $1.7 million in cash, which was
indisputably subject to the lien of Sun Capital
Partners; and (2) a highly speculative fraudulent
transfer claim asserted by the Creditors’
Committee against Sun and CIT Group. The
estate was without resources to prosecute that
claim since its cash was encumbered by Sun.
Unrebutted proferred testimony established that
it would cost millions of dollars, aside from
attorneys’ fees, to bring the claim to trial. J.A. 234
(Hearing Transcript). There was also unrebutted
proffered testimony that there were substantive
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3
obstacles to succeeding on that claim, including a
litany of affirmative defenses and a counterclaim.
Id. at 235. Finally, there was an unrebutted
proffer of testimony that even if the litigation
succeeded, there might be benefit only to
administrative creditors (i.e., no benefit or
distribution to general unsecured or priority
creditors) because there would still be an
overhang of tens of millions of dollars in claims.
Id. at 236; see 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (2012).
Under the foregoing circumstances, the
Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement under
which Sun released its lien on the cash of $1.7
million, CIT paid $2 million into the estate and
both were released from all claims in the
fraudulent transfer litigation. The settlement
therefore created a monetized $3.7 million benefit
for the estate, which paid all administrative
claims, and provided a modest but meaningful
distribution to 1,010 general unsecured creditors.
Pet. App. 39a. (Dist. Ct. opinion).
Very significantly, it is uncontested that the
Bankruptcy Court properly applied the relevant
legal factors in approving the settlement. As
stated in the opinion below, “[n]one of the objectors
contend that the bankruptcy court erred in
concluding that the balance of these factors [in
In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996)] favors
settlement, and we agree.” Pet. App. 11a (citing
Bankr. Ct. opinion). Also very significantly, no-one
contested the Bankruptcy Court’s findings that:
(1) there was “no prospect” of a confirmable
chapter 11 plan, id. at 14–15a (quoting Bankr. Ct.
opinion); (2) conversion to chapter 7 would have
been unavailing since the trustee would have no
funds for prosecuting the fraudulent transfer
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4
claims, Sun and CIT credibly having stated that
they would not settle in a chapter 7, id. at 8a; (3) the
omission of the Petitioners from the settlement
“would not prejudice them,” id., and (4) the choice
between approving and not approving the settlement was a choice between a “meaningful return
or zero.” Id. at 9a (quoting Bankr. Ct. opinion).
Against that background, Petitioners opposed
the settlement because it did not provide a
recovery for them on their WARN Act claims.
They urge that the settlement is invalid as
violating the so-called “absolute priority rule.”
At the outset, Amici note that the Petitioners’
objection is more academic than real. Had the
settlement been disapproved as Petitioners urge,
the Petitioners still would have had no recovery
from the $1.7 million in the estate because that
money would have gone to Sun, the $2 million
paid by CIT would not have existed, and the
estate would have been left with a hotly contested
fraudulent transfer action that it had no way to
fund or prosecute. Indeed, the estate’s fraudulent
transfer claim, its only lien-free asset, was highly
speculative and remote, and found to be
“effectively worthless”, id. at 61a (Bankr. Ct.
opinion), a finding which is unchallenged. In
short, Petitioners are not worse off under the
approved settlement than they would have been if
the settlement had been rejected. Because
Petitioners were not injured or prejudiced by the
settlement, the decision of the Circuit Court below
should be affirmed for that reason alone.
In stark contrast, however, the general unsecured
and administrative creditors would have been
indisputably far worse off had the settlement not
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5
been approved. In the absence of the settlement,
they would have received nothing. Even the
attorney for the United States Trustee, in opposing
the settlement, conceded in oral argument that
disapproving the settlement involved “a really
ugly result. . . .” Id. at 23a. (3d Cir. opinion
quoting Bankr. Ct. opinion). As the Bankruptcy
Court recognized, and as is undisputed on appeal,
the settlement provided a choice between a “meaningful return or zero.” Id. at 9a, 61a. Nevertheless,
Petitioners urge, in effect, that the so-called
absolute priority rule must always apply, without
exception, even when it leads to “a really ugly
result,” id. at 23a, as it indisputably would have
in this case.
Amici disagree with Petitioners. For the reasons
given below, the instant case is one in which
the priority rule need not be followed, and,
particularly in the absence of injury to the
objectant, should yield to the benefit of the estate
rather than blindly following the Rule and thereby
arriving at a really ugly result.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As a threshold argument, Amici urge that the
decision of the Circuit Court below should be
affirmed because Petitioners were not injured or
prejudiced by the settlement, under which they
are not worse off than if the settlement had been
rejected. Aside from that, the sole remaining issue
on this appeal is whether, given the facts and
record summarized above, the bankruptcy court
had discretion to approve the instant settlement,
even though it did not strictly follow the priority
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rule. The adequacy of the settlement itself is not
an issue in this case. As stated by the Circuit
Court below, “None of the objectors contends that
the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that the
balance of these factors favors settlement, and we
agree.” Id. at 11a (citing Bankr. Ct. opinion).
The Amici believe that the courts below
correctly decided not to apply the Rule under the
circumstances of this case. They urge that the
Rule need not be followed by a bankruptcy court
in approving a settlement where it finds that the
benefit, if any, to an objecting party is highly
speculative and remote, and where settlement
demonstrably provides substantial assets to the
estate, in this case a $3.7 million fund, thus
making it possible for distribution to be made to
most creditors who would otherwise receive
absolutely nothing.
Notably, while the present case is a rare one,
the Amici do not suggest that the bankruptcy
court has unrestrained discretion to approve a
settlement that deviates from the Rule. Rather,
the Amici suggest that a bankruptcy court’s
discretion is limited by the requirement that it
make specific findings, based on the record, that
the settlement will substantially benefit the
estate, that there is no realistic prospect that its
disapproval would benefit an objecting party, and
that there is no available basis for a party not
included in a settlement to obtain a distribution in
the bankruptcy if the approved settlement had
been rejected by the bankruptcy court.
Several reasons support the Amici’s position.
First. It is fundamental that the violation of a
right is not actionable if it does not result in
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injury. In the present case, the injury, if any,
incurred by Petitioners is not cognizable, for it
was highly speculative and remote at best. The
principle requiring injury as an essential element
of a right to relief is recognized under longestablished jurisprudence universally applicable
throughout the law. So strong is this principle
that even the violation of a constitutional right is
not actionable in the absence of injury. For this
reason alone, Petitioners are not entitled to relief.
Second. Despite its moniker, the priority rule is
not absolute. Even when the term was coined by
Mr. Justice Douglas in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products, 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (hereinafter, “Los
Angeles Lumber”), the priority rule really was not
absolute. Subsequently to Los Angeles Lumber,
there have been many instances in which courts
have not followed the priority rule, including
where no statutory text explicitly creates an
exception. A prime example is the well-established
doctrine permitting the substantive consolidation
of a debtor estate with another debtor estate or
even a non-debtor estate, resulting in out-ofpriority treatment of creditors. Other examples
are found in the many cases allowing crosscollateralization orders that transform pre-petition
unsecured claims into secured claims, and
payment of pre-petition employee wages, in order
to keep the debtor’s business going. A further
example is the so-called critical vendor orders that
transmute pre-petition claims into post-petition
claims so as to secure trade credit. Not only have
the courts chosen to depart from the priority rule,
but Congress has chosen to do so in the Code as
well. Examples include assumption of contracts
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where pre-petition defaults are converted from
general unsecured claims into cure amounts
payable as administrative expenses, and reclamation claims that convert pre-petition claims into
post-petition claims.
In light of such examples showing that the Rule
is not absolute, it is unsurprising that wellreasoned decisions have approved settlements
departing from the Rule. See, e.g., In re Iridium
Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007)
(hereinafter “Iridium”), discussed infra. Crucially,
such settlements do not violate this Court’s
precedent in Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,
390 U.S. 414, 453 (1968) (hereinafter “TMT
Trailer”) as that case, which addressed a plan
under chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act, did
not extend the priority rule to settlements.
Third, the findings and conclusions made below
are sufficient to uphold approval of the
settlement. Further, the requisite findings, which
are based on the record carefully developed at the
hearing, are conceded and can no longer be
controverted by any party. If, however, for any
reason the Court finds them to be inadequate, the
appropriate action is a remand. Significantly, in
that regard, the Court simply required new
hearings on valuation and insolvency by way of
remand in TMT Trailer. Indeed the most that
TMT Trailer would require in the present case is a
remand. And if this Court were to believe that a
further record and findings would be appropriate,
the Amici request that the Court direct that new
hearings be held to clarify why it was necessary
for the settlement to deviate from the priority
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rule, and, if the Bankruptcy Court were again to
approve the settlement, to require that court
carefully to articulate its reasons for its approval.
Remand was also what the court ordered in
Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466.
POINT I
UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED LAW, INCURRING INJURY IS ESSENTIAL TO RECOVER
FOR VIOLATION OF A RIGHT; SPECULATION
DOES NOT COUNT
A. Damages are awarded only if there has
been injury or prejudice
Under this Court’s jurisprudence, relief is not
granted for violation of a right that does not cause
injury or prejudice. As stated by this Court,
damages are not allowable on the basis of injury
that is “too remote and speculative to have any
legitimate effect upon the valuation.” Tenn. Valley
Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276 (1943),
citing McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363, 372
(1913); see also, Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg.
Co., 139 U.S. 199, 210 (1891) (stating “Tested by
them, such losses were, in our opinion, rather
remote and speculative than direct and immediate,
resulting from the breach alleged.”). Accord: CQ,
Inc. v. TXU Min. Co., L.P., 565 F.3d 268, 278 (5th
Cir, 2009) (explaining damages for breach of
contract are not awarded for damages that are
“remote, contingent, speculative, or conjectural”)
quoting City of Dallas v. Villages of Forest Hills,
L.P., Phase I, 931 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1996); Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Am.
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Safety Prod., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 601–02 (6th Cir.
1987) (“As a general rule, ‘damages are not
permitted which are remote and speculative in
nature.’”) (quoting Agricultural Services Ass’n v.
Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1072 (6th
Cir. 1977)); Sanders v. Flanders, 564 Fed. App’x
742, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (“It is well settled that
damages cannot be established merely through
speculation or conjecture.”).
This Court has made it abundantly clear that
the requirement of injury is at the heart of a claim
for damages for violation of a right.
An injury, legally speaking, consists of a
wrong done to a person, or, in other
words, a violation of his right. It is an
ancient maxim, that a damage to one,
without an injury in this sense, (damnum
absque injuria), does not lay the
foundation of an action . . . Want of right
and want of remedy are justly said to be
reciprocal. Where therefore there has
been a violation of a right, the person
injured is entitled to an action.
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479
(1938) (quoting Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288,
302–03 (1864)) (emphasis added).
B. Petitioners suffered no injury
approval of the settlement

from

Tested by this Court’s long-established
jurisprudence, Petitioners have not been injured
or prejudiced by the approval of the settlement at
issue, and cannot prevail for that reason alone.
They would not have had any recovery in this
bankruptcy even if, as they demanded, the
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settlement had been rejected by the Bankruptcy
Court and this chapter 11 case had been converted
to chapter 7. This was made evident by two of the
many uncontested findings made by the
Bankruptcy Court and adopted by the Circuit
Court below. First, it found that “there was ‘no
realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution
[either in chapter 7 or chapter 11] to anyone but
the secured creditors unless the settlement were
approved . . . .” Pet. App. 8a (quoting Bankr.
Ct. opinion). Second, it found that Petitioners
“omission from the settlement distribution would
not prejudice them.” Id. This is “because their
claims against the Jevic estate were ‘effectively
worthless’ since the estate lacked any unencumbered funds,” essential to prosecute the estate’s
highly speculative fraudulent transfer claims
against the secured creditors. Id. (quoting Bankr.
Ct. opinion).
Moreover, the courts below realistically recognized that there were substantial questions over
causation and valuation in claims arising from the
Debtor’s leveraged buyout, and that the estate had
no funds to shoulder the enormous costs for expert
trial testimony and a host of other litigation costs,
apart from legal fees, to go forward with litigating
its claims and defeating the asserted substantive
defenses and counterclaims. Id. at 9a. In that
regard, see In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 70
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (hereinafter, “Exide”)
(“There is no doubt that [fraudulent transfer]
litigation involves complex issues on a variety of
topics that will require costly and time-consuming
discovery in addition to a potentially lengthy trial,
possibly delaying the Debtor’s exit from chapter
11.”); In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 607
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(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he legal issues by
themselves are many and complex . . . Dealing
with them would be expensive and timeconsuming.”); In re Lids Corp., 281 B.R. 535, 540
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (Litigating the worth of a
business enterprise requires using multiple
complex valuation methodologies in testimony by
financial experts).
The courts below thus properly applied the
fundamental principle that there can be no
recovery for the violation of a right in the absence
of injury. They denied relief because Petitioners’
claimed harm was based on nothing more than
their wishful thinking that blocking the settlement
and converting to chapter 7 might have produced
some recovery for them. Their position, however,
was unsubstantiated at the hearing before the
Bankruptcy Court, at which they chose not to offer
any evidence of value for the estate’s fraudulent
transfer claims, despite Respondents’ showing that
those claims were of dubious, if any, value. There
was simply no basis in evaluating those claims at
the hearing on settlement for the Bankruptcy
Court to find that Petitioners’ speculation and
hope could have “any legitimate effect upon the
valuation.” Powelson, 319 U.S. at 276.
The Bankruptcy Court correctly approved the
settlement on the basis, among others, that
Petitioners were not injured by the approval of the
settlement.
C. Origin of the requirement of injury
Injury is not a recent requirement of the law.
For centuries, injury was a critical feature of early
common law, which required a lawsuit to be
commenced by means of an established form of
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complaint, which required an allegation of actual
injury to the plaintiff. See Benjamin Shipman,
Handbook of Common-Law Pleading sections 7, 77
(3d ed. 1923). See also William Blackstone, 3
Commentaries on the Law of England 117
(1765–1769); Edward P. Weeks, The Doctrine of
Damnum Absque Injuria Considered in Relation to
the Law of Torts ix (1879) (hereinafter, “Weeks”)
(premising the requirement of injury on the right
of a person to be secure in his life, liberty, health,
reputation, and real and personal property).
Under that doctrine, a person cannot maintain an
action for a wrongful act unless he has sustained
an injury. Id.
Although the common law forms of pleading
have long since been superseded by the modern,
less stringent requirements for pleadings in a
case, injury remains an essential ingredient of
every type of right to recover for a violation of a
right and of every claim for relief. It is a
fundamental requirement without which relief is
not available. There is no theoretical or statutory
basis to disregard the requirement of injury.
D. Injury continues to be required across
the law as a basis for providing relief
Current jurisprudence continues to include
injury as a requisite for maintaining a cause of
action or for obtaining relief for the violation of a
right. Under modern practice, the fundamental
requirement of injury is a mandatory element of
every type of cause of action if relief is to be
available. As a consequence, a violation of the
priority rule does not result in the grant of an
award in the absence of injury to the objectant.
Illustrations of this requirement can be found
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across the law, including constitutional law,
criminal law, tort law and contract law, among all
others.
1.

Constitutional law

Despite the high level of importance of
constitutional rights, a violation of such rights is
not actionable if the plaintiff has not incurred
injury or prejudice as a result of the violation. As
uniformly held by Courts of Appeals, a violation of
a constitutional right is not actionable if the
plaintiff has not been injured by the violation. See
Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2010); Rapp
v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 52 F.3d 1510, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995);
Brock v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 801 F.2d 926,
930–31 (7th Cir. 1986); Savina Home Indus., Inc.
v. Sec’y of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1365 (10th Cir.
1979); In re Parcel Consultants, Inc., 8 F. App’x
946, 951 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, even a right as
important as due process of law is not actionable
in the absence of injury to the complainant. The
right asserted by Petitioners on the basis of the
priority rule has no greater value than the right to
due process. Thus, without a cognizable injury to
Petitioners resulting from the settlement, they are
not entitled to relief from the settlement by way of
vacating the approval of the settlement and a
conversion to chapter 7, or requiring the disgorgement of the distributions received years ago by
over 1,000 creditors for redistribution under the
priority rule, or otherwise.
2.

Criminal Law

It is similarly fundamental to American
criminal law that criminal prosecutions be
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conducted with constitutionally afforded
protections for the accused. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). Nevertheless, despite the importance of personal rights
afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution, a
conviction is not reversed where the violation of a
right is found not to have been prejudicial to the
defendant under the so-called “harmless error”
rule. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711; see also Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000); Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993) (Court
denying habeas relief where error that occurred at
trial did not substantially influence the jury’s
verdict). Indeed, as the Court observed, all 50
States as well as Congress have established
harmless-error rules. Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 22 (1967). There is surely no greater
reason to adopt a “harmless error” rule to enable a
claimant to recover in a civil case in the absence of
any cognizable injury than there was in the
criminal law.
3.

Tort and Contract Law

The requirement of injury is a central element
in the law of torts. Two of the first treatises on
tort law explained that a plaintiff must have
suffered some “injury” or “damage” to recover on a
claim. See 1 Francis Hillard, The Law of Torts or
Private Wrongs 83-84 (2d ed. 1861); see also 1 C.G.
Addison, Wrongs and Their Remedies: A Treatise
on the Law of Torts 2 (4th English ed., F.S.P.
Wolferstan ed. 1876). A leading treatise writer
also makes clear that injury to the plaintiff is an
essential ingredient of a tort cause of action. See

69212 • COOLEY • USSC • AL 10/7/16 • AL 10/11/16 • AL 10/12/16 • AL 10/13/16 • AL 10/14/16

16
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts
8-9 (1941); see also, Restatement of Torts §1 cmt. d
(1934)).
The underpinning of the injury requirement was
explained in Edward P. Weeks’ leading treatise.
See Weeks, supra at ix. That scholar observes that
early tort common law was premised on the notion
that a person has a right to be secure in his life,
liberty, health, reputation, and real and personal
property, noting that the doctrine, damnum absque
injuria, literally means damage without injury. Id.
To constitute a tort, there must be “actual or legal
damage to the plaintiff, and a wrongful act
committed by the defendant.” Id. at 2 (citations
omitted).
Just as in tort law, injury must be established to
recover damages in an action for breach of
contract. See 24 Williston on Contracts § 64.8 (4th
ed.); see also, CQ, Inc. v. TXU Min. Co., L.P., 565
F.3d at 278.
The Circuit Court below was correct in relying
on the absence of injury or prejudice to Petitioners
in holding that the Bankruptcy Court properly
approved the settlement without its inclusion of
Petitioners. The decision below should be affirmed
because of the lack of injury to Petitioners,
making it unnecessary for the Court to address
whether the priority rule is a per se pronouncement that does not allow any exceptions.
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POINT II
THE PRIORITY RULE IS NOT ABSOLUTE
AND MANY TYPES OF DEPARTURES ARE
RECOGNIZED
A. T h e A b s o l u t e P r i o r i t y R u l e w a s N o t
“Absolute” Even When it Was Given Its
Name
The term “absolute priority rule” seems to have
originated with Mr. Justice Douglas in Los
Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 117. That case
presented the question “of the conditions under
which stockholders may participate in a plan of
reorganization under s 77B . . . of the Bankruptcy
Act where the debtor corporation is insolvent. . . .”
Id. at 108–09. Observing that the words “fair and
equitable” in section 77B(f) were “terms of art,” he
noted that such term of art had acquired “a fixed
meaning” including the prohibition in Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913),
against old shareholders retaining value under
reorganization plan at the expense of creditors.
Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 115. Justice
Douglas called this the “rule of full or absolute
priority.” Id. at 117. The use of the word
“ a b s o l u t e ” , w h i l e catching, is, unfortunately
overbroad and therefore inapt. In the first place,
t h e C o u r t i n L o s A n g e l e s Lumber was not
addressing inter-creditor priorities, such as those
involved in the case at bar.
Secondly, even at the time Los Angeles Lumber
was decided, this Court had contemplated the
propriety of shareholders being “permitted to
contribute and retain an interest [in the
reorganized entity] sufficiently valuable to move
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them [to provide funding].” Kansas City Terminal
Ry v. Cent Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455
(1926). Hence, calling the rule “absolute”
overstated its reach even in the context of
priorities between creditors and equity holders.
See generally, Lubben, “The Overstated Absolute
Priority Rule,” 21 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 581
(2016); Bruce Grohsgal How Absolute Is the
Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case
for Structured Dismissals (September 29, 2016),
William & Mary Bus. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017);
(manuscript at 25-30), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2845430 (hereinafter, “Grohsgal”). The
reality is that the phrase “absolute priority rule”
is a misnomer; the rule is not absolute and there
are many well-established and fully sanctioned
departures from it, as later discussed herein.
B. Absolute Rules Invite Injustice
Insofar as the priority rule is not absolute, it
should be unnecessary to point out that absolute,
rigid and unyielding rules are disfavored in our jurisprudence. Nonetheless, Petitioners’ urging to
apply the priority rule rigidly makes that necessary
to point out.
Civilized systems of justice, harkening back to
Aristotle, have recognized that hard and fast rules
lead to injustice because of the inability to foresee
every circumstance that could arise in the future. As
explained by Paul Vinogradoff, the Corpus Professor
of Jurisprudence in the University at Oxford:
[L]egal rules are necessarily general,
while the circumstances of every case are
particular, and that it is beyond the power
of human insight and science to lay down
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in advance rules which will fit all future
variations and complications of practice.
Therefore law must be supplemented by
equity (epieikeia); there must be a power
of adaptation and flexible treatment, sometimes suggesting decisions which will be at
variance with formally recognized law, and
yet will turn out to be intrinsically just.
Paul Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law 209 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2006, originally published
in 1914); see also, Randolph Haines, Eleventh
Circuit Distorts Equity With Formalism, 2016 No.
4 Norton Bankr. L. Advisor 1, 6 (2016) (citing
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book V, Ch. 10
(W.D. Ross Trans. 1925).
This Court has been wary of absolute rules,
even when dealing with something as sacrosanct
as the Constitution. Nearly a century has passed
since Justice Holmes in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson
astutely observed that “[t]he interpretation of
constitutional principles must not be too literal”
and “[w]e must remember that the machinery of
government would not work if it were not allowed
a little play in its joints.” 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1930).
An inflexible and rigid approach may unwisely
thwart both the administration of justice and the
need properly to address unforeseen circumstances.
See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577–78
(1964); Walz v. Tax Comm’n. of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970) (“there is room for play in the joints.
. . .”); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138
(1974) (same); Cf. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012)
(Court admonishing hyperliteral application of
statute contrary to common sense); see also Nelson
v. Scala, 192 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); Miller v.

69212 • COOLEY • USSC • AL 10/7/16 • AL 10/11/16 • AL 10/12/16 • AL 10/13/16 • AL 10/14/16

20
Okmi Sul (In re Miller), 299 F.3d 183, 186–87 (3d
Cir. 2002); Lehman v. VisionSpan, Inc. (In re
Lehman), 205 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000).
In sum, this Court’s jurisprudence against
absolutism stands as a general barrier to the
absolutism urged by Petitioners and their amici in
this case.
C. There Are Many Approved Departures
from the Priority Rule
There are many well-known and accepted
departures from the Rule, which are discussed
below. Amici suggest, and the discussion below
shows, that the unifying theme (or explanation) of
these departures is benefit to the estate, which,
together with the absence of harm to the
objectants, is precisely the rationale that led the
Courts below to approve the instant settlement.
1.

Substantive Consolidation is an Accepted
Departure From the Priority Rule

The doctrine of substantive consolidation is
one exception. Substantive consolidation allows
courts to disregard the separateness of entities
and thereby pool their assets and claims together
as if they were a single entity from which the
collective creditor body may recover. 2 Collier on
Bankruptcy, ¶ 105.09 (16th ed. 2016). Substantive
consolidation is a judicially created equitable
doctrine without explicit authorization in the
Bankruptcy Code. See In re Auto-Train Corp.,
Inc., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Eastgroup
Props. v. S. Motel Ass’n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248
(11th Cir. 1991); In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.,
Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Substantive consolidation ordinarily alters
distributional priorities because, as elaborated by
the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in
Auto-Train, “every entity is likely to have a
different debt-to-asset ratio, consolidation almost
invariably redistributes wealth among the
creditors of the various entities.” In re Auto-Train
Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d at 276. Notwithstanding this
prejudice suffered by some creditors, “[n]o court
has held that substantive consolidation is not
authorized.” In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195,
208 (3d Cir. 2005). Rather, substantive consolidation is required under “rare” and “justified” facts.
See e.g., Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v.
Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 846–47 (2d Cir. 1966)
(hereinafter, “Chemical Bank”).
The Chemical Bank case also explicitly
recognized that, in a proper case, benefit to the
estate is the dominant priority.
[I]n the rare case such as this, where the
interrelationships of the group are
hopelessly obscured and the time and
expense necessary even to attempt to
unscramble them [is] so substantial as to
threaten the realization of any net assets
for all the creditors, equity is not helpless
to reach a rough approximation of justice
to some rather than deny any to all.
Id. at 847 (emphasis added). In short, substantive
consolidation is a recognized exception to the Rule
where, as in this case, circumstances present a
choice between justice for some or justice for none.
As eloquently stated in Chemical Bank, “equity is
not helpless to reach a rough approximation of
justice to some rather than deny any to all.” Id.
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Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court in this case
properly approved a settlement conferring justice
on some, rather than disapproving the settlement
and denying justice for all.
2.

Critical Vendor Orders Are an Accepted
Departure from the Rule

Critical vendor orders are another compelling
example of where courts set aside the Code’s
priority scheme in order to benefit the bankruptcy
estate by enabling a reorganizing debtor to obtain
goods and services critical to its survival and
prospects of repaying debt. A critical vendor order
permits certain pre-petition creditors to be paid
out of priority as administrative claims to help the
debtor’s business continue and provide a better
chance (but not a guaranty) of recovery for the
creditor body as a whole. See generally, In re
Lehigh & New England Railway Co., 657 F.2d
570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981). Amici note that critical
vendor orders really are an exception to the Rule,
contrary to what is asserted in Brief for Amici
Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at
13, n.12. In fact, critical vendor payments are
final and not subject to disgorgement, thus
irrevocably re-arranging priorities. In re Meridian
Auto Sys.-Composites Operations, Inc. (In re
Meridian), 372 B.R. 710 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
Admittedly, critical vendor orders are not
universally accepted. See, e.g., Official Committee
of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299
(4th Cir. 1987); In re B&W Enters., Inc., 713 F.2d
534 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4
F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993); and see In re K-Mart
Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (restricting,
but not banning such orders). That being said,
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such orders are particularly accepted in the
Second and Third Circuits in which many of the
largest and most significant chapter 11 cases are
filed. Lehigh, 657 F.2d at 581; In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175 (Bankr. S.D., 1989).
Quite remarkably, a recent survey of large chapter
11 cases found that not one motion for a critical
vendor was denied. See, Elizabeth Shumejda,
Critical Vendor Trade Agreements in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 24 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. at 161
(2016). In short, critical vendor orders are far more
accepted and commonplace than they might appear
to be just based on tabulating the ostensible split
in authorities. Accordingly, such orders stand as a
meaningful accepted exception to the priority rule.
3.

Cross-Collateralization is an Accepted
Departure From the Rule

Cross-collateralization is yet another compelling
example of courts setting aside the Code’s priority
scheme when necessary to benefit the estate.
Cross-collateralization is a process by which a
debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) grants a lien on postpetition collateral to secure pre-petition unsecured
debt in order to obtain post-petition financing. See
generally, Jennifer J. Rickert, Cross Collateralization: An Appropriate Method of Section 364
Post-Petition Financing, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 239,
239–40 (1993). Cross-collateralization departs
from the Code’s priority scheme because it
“empowers an undersecured creditor-lender to
claim a greater portion of a business’ assets than
it would ordinarily receive under the repayment
rules established in the statutory text of the
Bankruptcy Code.” Craig R. Bucki, Cracking the
Code: The Legal Authority Behind Extrastatutory
Debtor-In-Possession Financing Mechanisms and
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Their Prospects for Survival, 2005 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 357, 361 (2005).
Yet, courts outside the Eleventh Circuit routinely
uphold cross-collateralization to give the DIP
necessary financing to run the business. In re
Adams Apple, 829 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.
1987); In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir.
1979) (leading case); In re Vanguard Diversified,
Inc., 31 B.R. 364 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re
Tower Air, 397 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2005). But see,
Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg.
Co.), 963 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
cross-collateralization is inconsistent with the Code).
In sum, here again, a majority of courts depart
from the Rule in dire circumstances. Crosscollateralization is permitted when without it, there
would be no DIP financing, and the reorganization
would be doomed. Accordingly, in approving the
settlement below, the Bankruptcy Court properly
departed from the Rule in order to avoid dooming
all creditors in this case to no recovery.
D. Settlements May Deviate from the Rule
Courts have not only recognized departures
from the Rule in the contexts of substantive
consolidation, critical vendor orders and crosscollateralization, but also leave room for such
departures in the context of settlements as well.
1.

This Court’s Decision in TMT Trailer
does not Prevent Any and All Departures
from the Rule in Settlements.

In TMT Trailer, 390 U.S. 414, this Court
considered a settlement that had been effectuated
in the context of a plan of reorganization under
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Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act. The case,
properly understood, presented two distinct
issues: first, the standard for approving a
settlement vel non; second, the standard for
confirming a Chapter X plan.
As to the first issue, the Court noted that a
settlement must be “fair and equitable” and that
the court in deciding whether to approve a settlement must make an “informed and independent
judgment” which requires that the judge “has
apprised himself of all facts necessary for an
intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be
litigated.” Id. at 424. This Court found, however,
that the record below in TMT Trailer left the Court
“completely uninformed as to whether the trial
court ever evaluated the merits” and that “the
record is devoid of facts which would have permitted
a reasoned judgment that the claims of actions
should be settled in this fashion.” Id. at 440–41.
These inadequacies were amon g t h e r e a s o n s
leading the Court to remand the case for “further
investigation.” Id. at 441.
Separately, this Court in TMT Trailer
considered plan confirmation requirements under
the now statutorily superseded provisions of
Chapter X, former 11 U.S.C. §501, et seq. On that
issue, this Court noted the fair and equitable
standard needed to confirm a chapter X plan
“incorporates the absolute priority doctrine.” Id.
(emphasis added). Nowhere, however, does the
TMT Trailer opinion instruct that the so-called
absolute priority rule applies to settlements,
except as incorporated in a Chapter X plan. See
Grohsgal at 42–46. Certainly TMT Trailer could
not have addressed the instant settlement, which
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took place under the current Code but not under a
plan. Indeed, the current Code, for its part,
confines the statutory application of the priority
rule to chapter 11 plans, 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
(2012) and to distributions in a chapter 7 case, 11
U.S.C. §726(a) (2012).
Therefore, the Circuit Court below got it right in
recognizing that TMT Trailer is “not dispositive
because [it] spoke in the context of plans of
reorganization, not settlements.” Pet. App. 17a.
And, the Circuit Court also got it right because it
had an ample record, unlike the lower court in
TMT Trailer.
2.

Iridium is a Well Reasoned Case Allowing
the Possibility that a Settlement May
Depart from the Rule.
(a) The priority rule is not a per se ban
under Iridium.

In Iridium, 478 F.3d at 455, the Second Circuit
endorsed the possibility of departure from the
priority rule in an appropriate settlement. Iridium
was an ill-fated satellite venture that had been
launched, but later spun off, by Motorola. Id. at
456. In the months preceding its collapse, Iridium
executed a series of credit facilities with its senior
lenders providing for $1.55 billion in loans secured
by first priority liens on all of Iridium’s property,
including causes of action against Motorola. Id. at
457. The unsecured creditors’ committee, given its
limited financial resources, opted to settle the
avoidance claims with senior lenders in order to
receive funds in which to pursue their own claims
against Motorola. Id. Although a large portion of
any monies recovered from Motorola as a result of
the Motorola Estate Action would likely flow to

69212 • COOLEY • USSC • AL 10/7/16 • AL 10/11/16 • AL 10/12/16 • AL 10/13/16 • AL 10/14/16

27
the Estate and be distributed according to the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, id. at 459,
nevertheless, the litigation trust provided for
payment to unsecured creditors of residual funds
from the litigation trust before full recovery of
some priority creditors, including Motorola. Id.
The Second Circuit rejected the per se ban on
settlements violating the priority rule as “too
rigid a test” because such a rigid test was unable
to “accommodate the dynamic status of some . . .
settlements.” Id. at 464. The Court explained “[i]t
is difficult to employ the rule of priorities in the
approval of a settlement in a case such as this
when the nature and extent of the Estate and the
claims against it are not yet fully resolved.” Id.
(b) A remand is the proper course if the
Court considers the record to be
inadequate
Since the record in Iridium provided no
justification for departing from the Rule in that
particular settlement, the Second Circuit in
Iridium, as in TMT Trailer, remanded the case for
further development of the record. Id. at 467. The
court in Iridium stated “[o]ur remand is not a
repudiation of that support—it seeks only clarification of why the settlement need require a possible
deviation from the rule in one regard.” Id. at 466.
Although some cases, such as Matter of AWECO,
Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984), have applied a
per se approach, Iridium’s careful methodology is
the better path. Because the central facts
warranting approval of settlement in this case are
uncontested, Amici submit the record here (unlike
that in TMT Trailer and Iridium) supports
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affirmance. If this Court does not share that view,
however, Amici respectfully submit that the
proper course is a remand, as in both TMT Trailer
and Iridium.
E. Congress Made Exceptions to the Rule
The cases just discussed show that the so-called
“absolute” priority rule is not absolute because the
courts have found numerous circumstances where
departure is appropriate and allowable: substantive
consolidation, cross-collateralization, critical
vendor orders and settlements. Still, it is not just
courts that have made the Rule not absolute, but
Congress as well. The term “absolute priority
rule” appears nowhere in the Code.
Further, the Code itself contains a number of
statutory exceptions to the rule: these include
contract and lease assumptions where pre-petition
defaults must be cured as administrative
expenses, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012), and reclamation
claims, 11 U.S.C. § 546 (2012).3 The point here is
not that there exists some express statutory
exception authorizing the settlement in the
instant case (although we are quick to note there
3

Intriguingly, as Prof. Grohsgal shows, Congressional
action since Los Angeles Lumber has consistently contracted,
or rolled back, the priority rule. See Grohsgal at 25-30,
discussing the 1952 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, the
enactment of 1978 Code allowing consensual plans to depart
from the rule, and the 1986 and 2005 legislative roll backs of
the priority rule as applied to certain family business. Of
course, Amici do not argue that these contractions create
an express statutory exception to approve the present
settlement. The point, rather, is to further illustrate how
unabsolute the priority rule really is.
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is no express prohibition either); rather, the point
is that the rule is not absolute, it yields statutorily
in some instances and judicially in other instances
where benefit to the estate is properly a dominant
concern.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS BELOW WERE BASED ON
A THOROUGH RECORD, HAVE BEEN CONCEDED, AND WERE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT
The Bankruptcy Court in the present case
received proffered testimony of Mr. Daniel Dooley,
the Debtors’ Chief Restructuring Officer, J.A. 205
(Hearing Transcript), and of the Creditors’
Committee financial advisor, Mr. Edward Gavin,
id. at 229. Both testified in support of the
settlement. No adverse witness testimony was
offered by proffer or otherwise. On crossexamination of Mr. Dooley, Petitioners’ attorney
chose not to address the merits of the fraudulent
transfer claims against the secured creditors,
which were being released under the settlement.
See generally id. at 211–26.
Supplementing the testimony of Mr. Dooley, the
proffered testimony in support of the settlement of
Mr. Gavin focused specifically on the fraudulent
transfer claims asserted against the secured
creditors that arose out of the debtor’s prebankruptcy leveraged buyout (“LBO”). He gave
uncontroverted proferred testimony that the
expert testimony that would be offered at trial
would establish that the LBO in 2006, two years
before the debtor’s chapter 11 filing in 2008 “was
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not the cause of the company’s failure,” J.A. 232,
but the failure was predicated on intervening events
that occurred after the LBO, “such as the declining economy and the shrinking demand for the
trucking kind of business that Jevic was in,” id.,
thereby undermining the important predicate of
causation of insolvency for winning fraudulent conveyance litigation. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Mr. Gavin also testified that these facts “would be
serious challenges” to proving that the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the LBO, id. at 232–33,
thereby undermining another predicate for
success. Mr. Gavin also testified that such
litigation would be very complex and costly
through trial and appellate stages, and that
counsel for the plaintiff would have to advance the
costs personally because the estate lacked the
funds to pay them. Id. at 233–36, 243. Mr. Dooley,
apart from Mr. Gavin, suggested the costs of
litigation were multi-million dollar costs, with no
identified source to pay for expert witnesses saying, “[w]ho is going to pay for those?” Id. at 225.
Mr. Gavin further testified that approval of the
settlement was the wiser course because of the
“substantial uncertainty in the further prosecution
of the lawsuit. . . .” Id. at 235. Lastly, the settlement deal itself would not have been available in
a chapter 7 case. The testimony offered through
these witnesses was uncontroverted.
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On the foregoing record, the Bankruptcy Court
had a solid basis for concluding that the settlement should be approved. That court got it dead
right that the choice was between meaningful
recovery or zero, and it correctly chose meaningful
recovery.
In upholding the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of
the settlement, the Circuit Court pointed out that
the Petitioners “mount no real challenge to the
Bankruptcy Court’s findings that there was no
prospect of a confirmable plan in this case and that
conversion to Chapter 7 was a bridge to nowhere.”
Pet. App. 14–15a (citing Bankr. Ct. opinion).
Significantly, the District Court, in affirming the
decision of the Bankruptcy Court, observed that
Petitioners “largely do not contest the bankruptcy
court’s factual findings.” Id. at 40a. Crucially, the
Third Circuit noted that “even if it were
appropriate for us to review findings of fact de
novo,” there was “no evidence” that questioned the
Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that approval of the
settlement offered the only basis for making a
distribution to unsecured creditors. Id. at 21a. Nor
was there anything in the record to contradict the
finding that the fraudulent transfer claims “were
‘effectively worthless.’” Id. at 8a (3rd Cir. opinion
quoting Bankr. Ct. opinion). Finally, there is no
claim that the applicable standard for approving a
settlement set forth in In re Martin, supra, 91 F.3d
389, was not met.
Bluntly, where the factual predicates are
established by competent testimony and are
uncontradicted, and where the applicable legal
standard for approving the motion has concededly
been met, the settlement should be upheld. It is
elemental that absent a clearly erroneous finding
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of fact or an error of law the approval of a
settlement should be upheld. See United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, (1948) (this
Court may reverse findings of fact by a trial court
where ‘clearly erroneous’); see also id. (“A finding
is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”).
POINT IV
THE DEPARTURE FROM THE PRIORITY
RULE
WAS
APPROPRIATE
BECAUSE
REJECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT AND
CONVERSION TO CHAPTER 7 WOULD
HAVE HARMED THE ESTATE WITHOUT
HELPING PETITIONERS
In the present case, the estate’s assets were
fully encumbered. Pet. App. 8a (3rd Cir. opinion
citing Bankr. Ct. opinion). Conversion to chapter 7
would have been of no avail to Petitioners even if
the fraudulent transfer claims were successful,
because the secured lenders’ liens would have
denuded the estate in short order. Id. The
settlement approved in this case provides wider
recovery for the large creditor body than would
application of the Rule or conversion to chapter 7.
See id. at 57–58a (Bankr. Ct. opinion). Here, not
only would reversing the decision below not
provide a recovery for Petitioners, it would
actually result in injury to the estate and over
1,000 general unsecured creditors. Unrebutted
testimony at the settlement hearing established
that the fraudulent conveyance litigation would
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cost millions of dollars to bring the case to trial.
J.A. 234 (Hearing Transcript). Indeed, the
Bankruptcy Court specifically opined that any
lawyer that would take this litigation on a
contingency fee basis “should have his head
examined.” Pet. App. 61a (Bankr. Ct. opinion). Cf,
Exide, 303 B.R. at 70.
Moreover, if the case were converted to chapter
7, the recovery that was afforded to the general
unsecured creditors through the settlement would
not have been effectuated. The secured creditors
“stated unequivocally and credibly that they
would not do this deal in a Chapter 7.” Pet. App.
8a (3d Cir. quoting Bankr. Ct. opinion).
Further, the Bankruptcy Court specifically
found that there was “no realistic prospect” of a
meaningful distribution to anyone but the secured
creditors unless the settlement were approved.
[B]ecause the traditional routes out of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy were impracticable
. . . there was “no prospect” of a confirmable Chapter 11 plan of reorganization or
liquidation being filed. . . . [C]onversion to
liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code would have been unavailing
for any party because a Chapter 7 trustee
would not have had sufficient funds “to
operate, investigate or litigate” (since all
the cash left in the estate was encumbered)
and the secured creditors had “stated
unequivocally and credibly that they
would not do this deal in a Chapter 7.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Bankruptcy Court also
found that the claims against the Jevic estate
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were “effectively worthless” since the estate lacked
any unencumbered funds. Id. at 61a (Bankr. Ct.
opinion).
The Petitioners largely “[did] not contest the
bankruptcy court’s factual findings” at the District
Court, id. at 40a, and the Third Circuit declined to
question them on appeal. Id. at 21a. Left with
undisturbed factual findings that conclusively
establish that Petitioner’s inability to recover
remains the same regardless of the application of
the Rule, this appeal both has and will only
produce increased costs and harm to the estate
and its large body of general unsecured creditors.
Conversion to a chapter 7 would result in no
payment to creditors other than the secured
creditors because they would not have released
the lien on the $1.7 million and would not have
agreed to provide the $2 million cash infusion for
the benefit of the estate.
The only reason there is any recovery available
under chapter 11 is because the secured lenders
are providing a net gain of $3.7 million to the
estate. The relief requested by Petitioners would
eliminate this net gain, leaving the estate with no
unencumbered assets, thus foreclosing its ability
to pursue the costly fraudulent conveyance
litigation. Therefore, the relief requested by
Petitioners is a “bridge to nowhere.” Id. at 15a (3d
Cir. quoting Bankr. Ct. opinion).

69212 • COOLEY • USSC • AL 10/7/16 • AL 10/11/16 • AL 10/12/16 • AL 10/13/16 • AL 10/14/16

35
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and Respondents’ brief, it
is respectfully requested that the Third Circuit’s
decision be affirmed. Alternatively, if the Court
concludes that further development of the record is
warranted, it is respectfully urged that the Court
order a remand for consideration of why Petitioners
were not included in the settlement and whether
there was any means for them to realize a recovery
in the bankruptcy.
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